Sixth Circuit Rejects Argument That ALJ Required To Explain How Aboveground Mining Conditions Were Substantially Similar To Underground Mine

To establish a rebuttable presumption of pneumoconiosis, a claimant can prove that he or she has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment and spent at least 15 years working in an underground coal mine or “in coal mines other than underground mines in conditions substantially similar to those in underground mines.”  20 C.F.R. § 718.305(b)(1).  The U.S. Department of Labor issued the following regulation in 2013 further explaining the requisite proof:  “The conditions in a mine other than an underground mine will be considered ‘substantially similar’ to those in an underground mine if the claimant demonstrates that the miner was regularly exposed to coal-mine dust while working there.”  20 C.F.R. § 718.305(b)(2).  If that presumption is established, the mining company must then prove that the miner has neither clinical or legal pneumoconiosis or show that the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine.  30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit rejected a mining company’s argument that an ALJ’s decision awarding benefits to an aboveground miner should be vacated because the ALJ failed to explain how the conditions of the aboveground miner’s employment were substantially similar to the conditions prevalent in underground mines.  The mining company argued that an explanation of the conditions that were prevalent in each place was necessary to any analysis comparing them.  The Sixth Circuit emphasized the 2013 regulation and pointed to the ALJ’s finding that the dust the miner was exposed to included coal-mine dust; the court noted that even though the 2013 regulation was enacted after the ALJ’s opinion, a new interpretive regulation that “is substantively consistent with prior regulations or prior agency practices, and has been accepted by all Courts of Appeals to consider the issue,” can be applied to cases pending at the time the regulation is promulgated.